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In this paper we propose minority voting as a scheme that can partially protect individuals 
from the risk of repeated exploitation. We consider a committee that meets twice to decide 
about projects where the first-period project may have a long-lasting impact. In the first 
period a simple open majority voting scheme takes place. Voting splits the committee into 
three groups: voting winners, voting losers, and absentees. Under minority voting only voting 
losers keep the voting right in the second period. We show that as soon as absolute risk 
aversion exceeds a threshold value minority voting is superior to repeated application of the 
simple majority rule. 
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Suppose a society or committee takes several project decisions in series. When projects
are durable, individuals risk their utility losses accumulating over time if they repeat-
edly belong to the minority under the simple majority rule. If individuals are risk-
averse, this is undesirable from an ex ante perspective. In this paper we propose
minority voting as a scheme that can partially protect individuals from the risk of
repeated exploitation. Minority voting is most conveniently demonstrated in a two-
period set-up. Under minority voting, only individuals belonging to the minority in
the ﬁrst period are allowed to vote in the second period.
The core idea and motivation of minority voting in the context of social decisions can
be illustrated by a simple example. Three persons who enjoy going out together can
either go to the cinema, where they can choose between two ﬁlms, or to a restaurant,
where they again have a choice of two, e.g. Italian or Chinese. Suppose that, using
simple majority rule, two of them can assert their preferred decision in the ﬁrst stage
(e.g. going to the cinema), while the third person might have preferred the other
alternative (going to a restaurant). In order to minimize the losses that occur by going
to the cinema, the third person, i.e. the minority in the ﬁrst stage, obtains the sole
right to choose which ﬁlm they will see. This example is a demonstration of minority
voting. A group takes several decisions in series, and these decisions are linked because
the second choice depends on the ﬁrst. The minority in the ﬁrst instance is given the
exclusive right to make the choice in the second stage.
The same idea is illustrated by the following infrastructure project example where a
community decides about two technologically independent projects. Suppose a city
making a decision ﬁrst on whether to build a new expressway and second on whether
to build an airport, thus increasing air traﬃc and noise. The city can decide on each
project by simple majority voting. Under minority voting, the expressway is also
decided upon by the simple majority rule. However, only the minority from the ﬁrst
stage of voting will vote on whether to build the airport. Such a procedure gives
individuals who may be living close to the new road and thus suﬀering from increasing
noise a better chance of protecting themselves from further noise pollution due to
additional air traﬃc. Vice versa, individuals who want better and faster traﬃc routes
2may have better chances of realizing at least one of the infrastructure projects, as a
defeat in the ﬁrst stage may exclude opponents from involvement in the decision on
the airport.
Our examples illustrate the basic trade oﬀs of minority voting. In comparison with
repeated simple majority rule, minority voting, on the one hand, protects individuals
from being outvoted repeatedly. On the other hand, some individuals are excluded
from decisions in the second period, which creates negative externalities. The theme
of this paper is to identify the circumstances under which minority voting is prefer-
able to repeated simple majority voting for technologically independent projects. We
characterize the equilibria under minority voting. Typically such equilibria involve the
formation of the smallest majority and thus the largest minority in the ﬁrst period as
every individual of the majority must be pivotal. Our central ﬁnding indicates that
minority voting is superior to repeated simple majority voting as soon as the degree of
risk aversion exceeds some threshold value. In such circumstances, increasing the fu-
ture voting power of minorities today goes hand in hand with an increase in aggregate
eﬃciency.
Our paper is part of the literature on linking voting across problems. Casella (2005)
introduces storable votes mechanisms, where a committee makes binary decisions re-
peatedly over time and where agents may store votes over time.1 Qualitative voting
as introduced by Hortala-Vallve (2005) is closely related to storable votes. Individuals
obtain a stock of votes at the start and hence can decide in the following ballots on
what issue to exert more or less inﬂuence, i.e. to cast more or less votes. Jackson and
Sonnenschein (2005) show that, when problems are repeated many times, full eﬃciency
can be reached at the limit and that this insight essentially applies to any collective
decision problem.
Linkages of voting across issues can also occur through vote trading which goes back
at least to Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Coleman (1966), and has been developed
amongst others by Brams and Riker (1973), Ferejohn (1974), Philipson and Snyder
(1996) or Piketty (1994). We focus on other collective decision problems, where earlier
1Cummulative voting is related voting mechanism where individuals can also cast more than one
vote for one alternative (see for example Sawyer and MacRae (1962), Brams (1975), Cox (1990),
Guinier (1994) or Gerber, Morton, and Rietz (1998)).
3decisions may have a durable impact, thus making it very costly to be in the minority
at the earlier stage and very valuable to have more voting rights in the future. By
introducing minority voting, we make a new proposal for addressing the most diﬃcult
issue in designing collective decisions: how to design processes that bridge two core
principles: (a) ‘same right for each person to inﬂuence outcomes’ and (b) ‘respecting
and protecting minorities’ (see e.g. Guinier (1994) or Issacharoﬀ, Karlan, and Pildes
(2002)).
The paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we introduce the model, e.g. the
society, the utility functions and the new voting scheme. The voting equilibria of the
two-period game of our model are described in section 3. We provide a general welfare
comparison in section 4. Section 4.2 deals with case where the ﬁrst-period project
is not adopted and hence no utility impact of the ﬁrst project on the second period
occurs. The case where the ﬁrst-period project is realized will be discussed in section
4.3. The last part of the interim comparison is given in section 4.4 where we assume
that individuals have constant absolute risk aversion, i.e. we derive a result for a special
utility function. An ex-ante comparison between both voting schemes in the case of
constant absolute risk-aversion is presented in section 5. This leads to the main result
of this paper. Section 6 concludes, and the Appendix contains calculations (part A),
proofs (part B) and tables and graphics (part C).
2 The Model
2.1 The Set-up
We consider a committee of N (N uneven) individuals that meets twice – today (period
t = 1) and tomorrow (period t = 2) – to vote on a proposal that aﬀects the utility of
all members. In each period t = 1,2, the collective decision is binary. Speciﬁcally, the
committee decides in each period between the status quo and a project.
42.2 Utilities and Aggregate Welfare
The payoﬀ in both periods is given as follows:
• In the ﬁrst period, individual i’s utility is given by ui1 = f(a1zi1). The committee
decision is represented by the indicator variable a1 and assumes two values: a1 = 0
denotes the status quo, and a1 = 1 represents the new project, which changes the
status quo. The variable zi1 represents the beneﬁts from the project for individual
i in period t = 1. We assume that zi1 takes one of the values {−1,−γ,γ,1},
γ ∈ (0,1), with equal probability. The utility function f is assumed to be concave,
strictly increasing and integrable. The utility of the status quo is normalized to
zero. Individuals with zi1 ≥ 0 (zi1 < 0) are called project winners (project
losers) respectively. Individuals are ordered by their ﬁrst-period preferences, i.e.
i < j ⇒ zi1 ≤ zj1 has to hold.
• We assume that the project in the ﬁrst period may be durable, i.e. it has lasting
consequences, and it represents the status quo in the second period if a1 = 1.
In the second period, a new project arises upon which the committee decides.
We use a2 to denote the indicator variable specifying whether the new project
in period t = 2 is adopted (a2 = 1) or rejected (a2 = 0). Such a set-up is in
line with the spirit of our infrastructure example in the Introduction. Utility of
individual i in the second period is given by
ui2 = f(²a1zi1 + a2zi2)
where zi2 is assumed to be uniformly distributed on [−1,1] and ² is the deprecia-
tion rate of the impact of the ﬁrst-period project. The polar cases ² = 1 (² = 0)
cover the cases where the ﬁrst-period project is completely (not) durable.
• Overall expected utility of individual i is given by








ui2 is the second-period aggregate utility,
δ ∈ (0,1] denotes the discount factor.
5We will do an interim comparison in section 4, i.e. in the case where ﬁrst-period
preferences {zi1}N
i=1 are given, and an ex ante comparison in section 5 where the
{zi1}N
i=1 are not yet distributed. Hence, we deﬁne
E1 := expected value in the ex ante case, i.e. at the beginning of t = 1
E2 := expected value in the interim case, i.e. at the beginning of t = 2
We add the index MV (minority voting) or SM (simple majority rule) to W1 and
W2 to distinguish between the two voting schemes (the corresponding deﬁnitions are
presented in the next section). We use the utilitarian criterion, i.e. the minority voting
scheme MV is called superior to or socially more eﬃcient than SM if W MV ≥ W SM.
Furthermore, we assume that the committee members observe the realization of utilities
in the ﬁrst period so that the values {zi1}N
i=1 are common knowledge.
Some remarks regarding our set-up are in order. We work with discrete uniform distri-
bution in the ﬁrst period, as this simpliﬁes the formal analysis and makes it tractable.
While we could also work with a discrete distribution in the second period, a con-
tinuous distribution allows an easier presentation of the proofs. The assumption that
ﬁrst-period utilities are commonly known is essential, and we comment on the imcom-
plete information case in the concluding section.
2.3 Voting Rules
We compare two voting schemes: repeated simple majority voting (SM) and minority
voting (MV). While SM is standard and the equilibria in a setting with only two
alternatives are obvious, MV is a new voting scheme deﬁned as follows: In the ﬁrst
period, a simple open majority voting scheme takes place. If the status quo and the
project receive the same number of votes, the winner is determined by a tie-breaking
procedure where status quo and the project are selected with probability 1
2. Since voting
takes place openly, we can split the committee into three groups: voting winners, voting
losers, and absentees.
6Minority voting is now simply deﬁned as
MV: In the second period, only voting losers are allowed to vote.2
Note that voting losers are not necessarily project losers, i.e. individuals with negative
utility, if the ﬁrst-period project is realized. Similarly, voting winners may not be
project winners.
It is obvious that MV invites strategic voting. Suppose that in the ﬁrst period members
vote sincerely. Suppose that the size of the majority is larger than N+1
2 . Then, at least
one member of the majority has an incentive to vote against his preferences. The
outcome is not aﬀected but this member can preserve his voting right for the second
period. However, such attempts are limited by the fact that joining voting losers may
turn this group into voting winners, thus eliminating future voting rights.
3 Equilibria under MV
In this section we analyze the existence and style of voting equilibria under MV. In order
to eliminate implausible equilibria, we exclude weakly dominated voting strategies and
look for perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria in pure strategies. We start with the second
period where the simple majority rule is applied. Therefore, all individuals i who have
voting right in t = 2 will vote in favor of their preferences zi2 (if weakly dominated
strategies are eliminated). This uniquely determines the second-period equilibrium.
We will therefore concentrate next on the ﬁrst period.
3.1 Existence
We start with some simple observations regarding the nature of perfect Bayesian Nash
equilibria under the MV rule. Let I− be the set of all project losers in the ﬁrst period:
I
− = {i ∈ {1,..,N} : zi1 < 0}
2A variant of MV is to allow absentees in the ﬁrst period to keep their voting right. Then, only
voting losers and absentees are allowed to vote in the second period.
7The number of project losers will be denoted by k, i.e. k = |I−|.3
Proposition 1
For ﬁrst-period equilibria the following statement holds:
(i) The number of absentees is zero.
(ii) If the number of project losers k ≥ N+1
2 , then N+1
2 project losers will vote for
a1 = 0. The rest of the committee favors a1 = 1. The status quo prevails.
(iii) If k < N+1
2 , then N+1
2 project winners will vote for a1 = 1. All other individuals
will vote for a1 = 0. The project is adopted.
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in Appendix B.












possible partitions of the project winners into two
groups, i.e. N+1
2 individuals who vote for the project and belong to the voting winners,
and N−1
2 − k individuals who vote against it and thereby belong to the voting losers.
Any combination of strategies that satisﬁes Proposition 1 represents an equilibrium.
This is summarized by the following corollary:
Corollary 1











voting equilibria if k ≥ N+1
2 .
3.2 Equilibrium Reﬁnement
The decision of individual i in t = 1 will be denoted by ai1, i.e. ai1 = 1 if individual
i votes for the change or project and ai1 = 0 if individual i votes against it. An
equilibrium is given by a tuple of decision strategies (ai1)i∈{1,...,N}. As a consequence of
the indeterminacy of equilibria in t = 1, we introduce a plausible reﬁnement that we
will call ‘Maximal Magnanimity’ (MM).
3|S| denotes the number of pairwise diﬀerent elements in a set S.
8MM: Voters who beneﬁt most from a decision form the majority, i.e.
• if k ≥ N+1
2 , then ai1 =
(
0, i ≤ N+1
2
1, otherwise
• if k < N+1
2 , then ai1 =
(




MM is a coordination device with the idea that individuals who beneﬁt more from
a decision than others do not take advantage of joining the minority (recall that we
assumed in section 2.2 that individuals are ordered by their ﬁrst-period beneﬁts zi1).
Individuals who beneﬁt little may switch sides in order to keep their voting right, if
this does not aﬀect the outcome. Of course, whether or not individuals can or will
coordinate is a delicate matter and has been the subject of a vast literature (see, e.g.
Crawford and Haller (1990) for a seminal contribution, Myerson (1997) for compre-
hensive discussions). We view MM as a convention in the community for the use of
minority voting, that is an equilibrium that everybody expects to be played (see Young
(1996)).
As a tie-breaking rule, we assume that in the case of indiﬀerence individuals have the
same probability of belonging to the minority: Suppose we have a committee consisting
of 21 members of whom 5 members have ﬁrst-period beneﬁts of −1 (they obtain indices
between 1 and 5), 3 members with ﬁrst-period beneﬁts of −γ (they obtain the indices
6 - 8 and vote against the project), and 13 members with beneﬁts of 1. The last group
divides itself into voting winners and voting losers by fair randomization to obtain the
equilibrium voting behaviour, i.e. the members draw their own index (between 9 and
21) randomly. The resulting voting strategy is a pure strategy according to MM.
3.3 Welfare Comparison
The following lemma simpliﬁes the welfare comparison.
Lemma 1
MV is interim superior to SM if and only if W MV
2 ≥ W SM
2 .
9Lemma 1 follows from the observation that the decision in the ﬁrst period is the same
under MV and SM, i.e.




4 The Second Period
In this section we compare E2[W MV
2 ] and E2[W SM
2 ] and derive some general expressions
for the welfare comparison between SM and MV in the second period.
4.1 General Characterization
In the second period, voting equilibria are unique and individuals vote sincerely. Every
individual who has the right to vote will select ai2 = 1 if and only if zi2 ≥ 0 as this
is a strictly dominant strategy for individuals with zi2 > 0 and we have assumed the
tie-breaking rule that individuals who are indiﬀerent vote in favor of the project. The
voting schemes only diﬀer with respect to the number of individuals participating in
the tally. As stated in Proposition 1, the equilibrium number of individuals who keep
their voting right in the second period under MV is N−1
2 . While the whole committee
votes under SM, only N−1
2 individuals vote under MV.
Suppose in t = 2 there are w individuals who are allowed to vote. The expected
welfare of an agent who has certain preferences in t = 2 depends on the probability of














The proof of Lemma 2 is given in Appendix B.
As the number of individuals with voting right in t = 2 equals N under SM, while only
N−1
2 individuals vote under MV, the expected utility of a ﬁrst-period voting loser under
10MV is higher than under SM: P(N) < P(N−1
2 ). The probability of winning decreases
if the number of individuals with voting right increases. By contrast, voting winners
in t = 1 under MV have no inﬂuence on the decision in t = 2. The probability that
their preferred decision will be taken is equal to 1
2, which is smaller than P(N). Hence
voting winners from t = 1 are worse oﬀ under MV than voters under SM. We will show
that if risk aversion exceeds some threshold the gain of being a voting loser under MV
outweighs ex ante the loss of being a voting winner. In the following we deﬁne some
general formula for the aggregate welfare.
4.1.1 Simple Majority Rule
Given a vector of realizations {zi1}N








































f(²a1zi1 + zi2)dzi2 + f(²a1zi1)
i
.
The aggregate expected utility mainly consists of four parts for each individual i:
Having non-negative second-period beneﬁt zi2 and winning with probability 1
2P(N)
(hence, a2 = 1), having non-negative zi2 but losing (i.e. a2 = 0) with probability
1
2(1 − P(N)), having negative zi2 and winning (i.e. a2 = 0) with probability 1
2P(N),
and ﬁnally having negative zi2 and losing (i.e. a2 = 1) with probability 1
2(1 − P(N)).
This basic structure is also given under MV, but there we have to distinguish between
the ﬁrst N−1
2 individuals who keep the voting right and hence win with probability
P(N−1
2 ) and the last N+1
2 individuals who loose their voting right and win in the
second period with probability 1
2. This calculation is given in the next section.
11It will be useful to deﬁne
∆E2[W
SM




















2 ] captures the diﬀerential impact on aggregate expected utility if the second
project is undertaken in t = 2. It will be easier to analyze than E2[W SM
2 ].
4.1.2 Minority Voting
As we have shown in Proposition 1, the number of voting losers in equilibrium equals
N−1
2 for N odd. Because of MM, the ﬁrst N−1
2 individuals form the minority if a1 = 1.
If a1 = 0 the minority is formed by individuals N+3
2 ..N. In that case E2[ui2] = E2[u] for
all individuals i, since no utility impact occurs from the ﬁrst-period project. Therefore
a change in the numeration of the individuals does not aﬀect the value E2[W MV
2 ]:
without loss of generality we can assume that individuals 1...N−1
2 form the minority.

















































































































0 f(²a1zi1 + zi2)dzi2 + (1 − P(N−1
2 ))
R 0








−1 f(²a1zi1 + zi2)dzi2
4.1.3 Comparison
As stated in Lemma 1 we need to derive a condition for E2[W MV
2 ] ≥ E2[W SM
2 ] to
show under what circumstances MV is superior to SM. We will analyze the general
case where second-period utility is given by a concave and increasing utility function
f(²a1zi1 + zi2). We will use the following lemma for the upcoming analysis:
Lemma 3
E2[W MV
2 ] ≥ E2[W SM
2 ] is equivalent to ∆E2[W MV
2 ] ≥ ∆E2[W SM
2 ].
Note that the expression a1zi1 is either zi1 ∈ {−1,−γ,γ,1} in the case where the ﬁrst
project is adopted (a1 = 1) or zero if the project is rejected (a1 = 0). To simplify
notation, in the following we use zi1 instead of a1zi1 which remains unaﬀected in the





f(²zi1 + ˜ zi2)d˜ zi2.
With this notation we obtain for the second period
Proposition 2



















F(zi1,1) − 2F(zi1,0) + F(zi1,−1)
i
≥ 0 (1)
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in Appendix B.
13Let A(zi1) denote the term F(zi1,1) − 2F(zi1,0) + F(zi1,−1). A simple analysis of
A(zi1) shows that A(zi1) is non-negative for all i ∈ {1,...,N} and decreasing in zi1 if f
is a concave, increasing function.

















2 ) > P(N) > 1
2. Hence, the ﬁrst summand represents the expected
utility gain of voting losers if MV is used. The second summand indicates the utility
loss of ﬁrst-period voting winners. Their probability of winning shrinks in the second
period. Hence, the question we have to answer is whether the gain of voting losers can
outweigh the expected utility loss of voting winners.
The overall comparison MV versus SM depends crucially on two parameters. First,
the more durable a project is, i.e. the higher ² is, the lower is the loss of ﬁrst-period
voting winners under MV. Their utility gain from the ﬁrst period lessens potential loss
in the second period. Second, if people are more risk-averse, they will want to reduce
the risk of large losses, so the MV voting scheme becomes more attractive to them.
4.2 The case a1 = 0
In this section we analyze the relation between SM and MV if the status quo prevails
in t = 1, i.e. if a1 = 0.4 In that case all individuals have the same basic utility in
the second period - namely the status quo utility (i.e. the utility independent of the
realization of the second project). Thus, we expect MV to be not optimal as a decision
upon a project that eﬀects everybody’s utility should be made by all members of the
committee under these circumstances. Indeed, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 3
Suppose a committee of N members whose utility can be described by a strictly in-
creasing, concave function f. In the case where a1 = 0 (i.e. z1,1,...,z N+1
2 ,1 < 0), SM is
superior to MV.
4The rejection of a project is equivalent to the case where projects are not durable, i.e. ² = 0.
14The proof can be found in Appendix B.
The intuition for Proposition 3 is obvious. If a1 = 0, there is no impact from ﬁrst-
period choices on second-period utility. Hence, there is no risk of repeated exploitation
and hence, restricting voting rights is not socially desirable.
Note that we obtain the same result if ² = 0, i.e. if the ﬁrst project (realized or not)
exhibits no utility impact on the second period.
4.3 Durable Projects: a1 = 1 and ² 6= 0
In this section we analyze the case where the ﬁrst-period project is accepted. Indi-
viduals who suﬀer from this project get a higher probability of compensation for this
utility loss under MV. We proceed with the result of Proposition 2, i.e. inequality (1)
in general.
Proposition 2 states that MV is superior to SM if and only if inequality (1) is fulﬁlled.










2 A(zi1) respectively for the voting winners. With these deﬁnitions
inequality (1) is equivalent to
(N − 1)[P(N−1
2 ) − P(N)]










2] =: Q(N) is a ﬁxed value for N given. We
have shown in the proof of Proposition 3 that Q(N) < 1 ∀ N ∈ N, N odd. Further-
more, the probability P(w) can be viewed as a binomially distributed random variable.
Hence, we can approximate it using the normal distribution. Doing so, we achieve as






A detailed description of the approximation and the calculation of the limit are given
in Appendix A.
Note that Q(N) is oscillating around its limit
√
2 − 1. It is greater than
√
2 − 1 if
N = 3b+4 with some b ∈ N (this will be denoted by N ≡ 3(4) from now on). Q(N) is
15smaller than its limit if N ≡ 1(4). This property is due to the fact that the probability
of winning P(w) is monotonically increasing for N odd, but not for N−1
2 (the number of
voting losers adopts even and odd numbers as N increases). Hence, we will distinguish
between these cases if necessary.
We summarize these observations in the following proposition.
Proposition 4










The RHS depends on several parameters, e.g. the ﬁrst-period beneﬁts zi1 of all individ-
uals or other parameters that might be needed for the utility function f, e.g. a level of
risk aversion. Hence, we will derive more results on the RHS in the next section where
we assume a speciﬁc utility function that exhibits constant absolute risk aversion.
4.4 Utility with Constant Absolute Risk Aversion
In this section we apply the result derived in section 4.3 on the concave utility function
f(zi1,zi2) = −exp(−r(²a1zi1 + zi2)).
The parameter r > 0 can be used to describe the risk aversion of the individuals.
This function exhibits constant absolute risk aversion.5 No matter how large or small
the utility, or rather the potential utility loss or gain is, risk aversion always remains
constant.
Beneﬁts zi1 are already known. Again we assume throughout this section that a1 = 1
(the case a1 = 0 was given in section 4.2) and ² > 0, i.e. the ﬁrst project is durable.
Hence, more than half of the individuals have a non-negative utility gain from the
project proposed in period 1.
5Absolute risk aversion is given by −
f
00(x)
f0(x) = r with x = ²a1zi1 + zi2..
16The condition we have to check is condition (2): MV is superior to SM iﬀ
(N − 1)[P(N−1
2 ) − P(N)]






We have shown that the LHS converges to
√
2−1 as N becomes large. With the con-
crete utility function f(zi1,zi2) = −e−r(²zi1−zi2) we can now analyze the RHS in more
detail. In Appendix B we prove the following proposition:
Proposition 5
Assume a society with N ≥ 2 individuals who have beneﬁts zi1 ∈ {−1,−γ,γ,1} from
a durable project in t = 1 and assume that there exists at least one individual who
suﬀers from the project in t = 1 and that there exist two individuals with diﬀerent
ﬁrst-period preferences.
Then there exists a critical level of risk aversion R, such that MV is better than SM if
individuals’ utility can be described by f(x) = −exp(−rx) with parameter r ≥ R.
Proposition 5 indicates that MV is interim superior to SM if individuals are suﬃciently
risk-averse and if there is at least one individual who suﬀers from the ﬁrst-period
project. Note that we have also assumed throughout this section that the project is
adopted in t = 1. The critical value R depends on N, ² and γ. The assumption of
at least two individuals with diﬀerent ﬁrst-period preferences is needed to ensure that
AW
AL is decreasing in r.
The critical level of risk aversion R = R(N,²,γ) is determined by the requirement that
the maximal value of
AW






(r) ≤ Q(N) ∀{zi1}
N
i=1}.
To get an impression of the size of R, we will use the approximation of Q(N) to derive
an algebraic expression for an upper boundary ˆ R of R that gives us the following
information: MV is better than SM for all r ≥ ˆ R and may be better for some smaller
r, depending on the size of the legislature N. The result is given in the following
corollary.
17Corollary 2
Given the situation of Proposition 5 with N ≡ 3(4), we obtain as upper boundary ˆ R

















The proof of Corollary 2 is given in Appendix B.
The following observations illustrate how the critical value ˆ R depends on parameters.
• If the ﬁrst-period project depreciates rapidly, i.e. ² is very small, then ˆ R becomes
larger. The individuals have to be more risk-averse for MV to be preferable over
SM.
• If individuals either beneﬁt or suﬀer strongly from the ﬁrst-period project (γ → 1)
then the loss of belonging to the project losers and therefore to the minority is
signiﬁcant even for slightly risk-averse individuals. Moreover, the lasting utility
gain from the ﬁrst-period project is higher for voting winners. The MV voting
scheme becomes more eﬃcient even if r - the rate of absolute risk aversion - is
small ( ˆ R(N,²,γ) decreases as γ goes up).
• ˆ R(N,²,γ) is increasing in N. If the committee becomes larger, then the indi-
viduals have to be more risk-averse for MV to be superior to SM. An immediate
consequence is that MV should only be applied on middle-sized or small commit-
tees in this context which indeed seems plausible.
In Appendix C a number of tables are provided that give values of ˆ R(N,²,γ). The tables
indicate that especially for a high ², i.e. when the project is durable, the necessary
degree of risk aversion ˆ R(N,²,γ) is very low (< 8). Considering infrastructure projects,
a high ² seems to be plausible.
In the next section we set out to derive an ex ante comparison between MV and SM,
i.e. when ﬁrst-period beneﬁts are not yet distributed.
185 The Main Result for the First Period
In this section we derive the ex ante welfare comparison for the utility function with
absolute risk aversion, given by f(x) = −exp(−rx), r > 0. We already know that
MV is superior to SM if a1 = 1, ² 6= 0 and individuals are suﬃciently risk-averse. On
the other hand, we have shown in section 4.2 that MV is worse than SM if a1 = 0 or
² = 0, i.e. in the case where there is no utility impact from the ﬁrst-period project.
The remaining question is whether MV could be ex ante socially more eﬃcient than
SM, i.e. when {zi1}N
i=1 are not yet known and all cases could occur. Can the losses
incurred by non-durable projects or non-accepted projects accruing between MV and
SM be compensated by the gain that the minority experiences?
According to Lemma 1 we can use the ex ante expected welfare of the second period
for the comparison. According to Lemma 3 it is suﬃcient to compare
∆E1[W
MV
2 ] and ∆E1[W
SM
2 ].
5.1 Ex Ante Perspective for Constant Absolute Risk Aversion
We have the following situation: zi1 ∈ {−1,−γ,γ,1} with γ ∈ (0,1), where each value
has the same probability, i.e. 1
4. We assume that the ﬁrst-period project is durable,
i.e. ² > 0. The set of all project losers is denoted by I−:
I
− := {i ∈ {1,...,N} : zi1 < 0}
We distinguish between two cases.
1. |I−| ≤ N−1
2 .
2. |I−| ≥ N+1
2 .
In the ﬁrst case, the proposal in t = 1 is adopted, i.e. a1 = 1. From Proposition 5
we know that if a1 = 1 and |I−| > 0, MV is superior to SM for suﬃciently risk-averse
individuals. In case two the status quo prevails, i.e. SM is superior to MV as stated
in Proposition 3.
In Appendix A calculations for ∆E1[W MV
2 ] and ∆E1[W SM
2 ] separately for both cases
are given.
195.2 Comparison
Similar to the results of the interim comparison, we can show that there is indeed
a critical value of risk aversion R∗ such that MV is ex ante superior to SM if the
individuals’ level of risk aversion r is greater than R∗. We ﬁrst show the existence of
R∗.
Proposition 6
Suppose a society of N members, whose utility in both periods (t = 1,2) can be
described by f(x) = −exp(−rx) with r > 0. Then there exists a critical value R∗ such
that MV is ex ante superior to SM if r ≥ R∗.
The proof of Proposition 6 is given in Appendix B. The intuition of this result is clear:
the more risk-averse individuals are, the more important is the potential loss under SM
if they belong to the minority and hence, the more attractive is MV.
5.3 Calculation of R∗
Proposition 6 suggests that the welfare gain due to MV, i.e. ∆E1[W MV
2 ]−∆E1[W SM
2 ],
is monotonically increasing in risk aversion. We did not need this property to show the
existence of a critical level of risk aversion at which MV becomes more attractive than
SM. We now turn to the numerical determination of R∗ for which monotonicity of the
welfare gain is needed. A constructive approach for the critical level of risk aversion
R∗ is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 7








Then the MV scheme becomes socially more eﬃcient than SM if risk aversion r of all
individuals is greater than R∗.
The proof of Proposition 7 follows directly from Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 which are
described below. To formulate the lemmas, we start with equation (6) from the proof




















with some constants C,c1,c2,c3,c4 and c5. Regarding these constants the following
lemma holds.
Lemma 4
The constants C,c3,c4 are positive, c1,c5 are negative. Furthermore, c1 < c2 < c3 = c4.
A proof is given in Appendix B.
Lemma 4 implies that the utility gain for voting losers under minority voting with
beneﬁts zi1 = −γ or zi1 = −1 has a positive eﬀect on the welfare diﬀerence (c3,c4 > 0),
while the utility loss of minority winners under MV (with beneﬁts zi1 = 1) has a
negative eﬀect (c1 < 0). Moreover, the utility gain through strategic voting does not
compensate these project winners for the utility loss of being a voting winner.
Individuals with zi1 = γ are more likely to switch sides due to strategic voting than
individuals with zi1 = 1. The resulting utility gain under MV is higher. Hence, their
overall utility change might even have a positive eﬀect on the diﬀerence ∆E1[W MV
2 ] −
E1[∆W SM]2. However, numerical results suggest that individuals with zi1 = γ also
have a negative utility change from SM to MV, i.e. c2 < 0.
With this result we can show the monotonicity of ∆E1[W MV
2 ] − E1[∆W SM
2 ].
Lemma 5
The welfare gain due to MV, i.e. ∆E1[W MV
2 ]−∆E1[W SM
2 ], is monotonically increasing
in r.
The proof of Lemma 5 is given in Appendix B.
Lemma 5 ﬁnally proves Proposition 7: If we can determine R∗ such that ∆E1[W MV
2 ](R∗)−
∆E1[W SM
2 ](R∗) = 0, we know that MV is better than SM if the absolute risk aversion
of all individuals is greater than R∗. We give some examples in the next section.
215.4 An Example
In this subsection we provide some numerical examples and focus on N = 3, i.e. the



















We assume that r > 0 and obtain
∆E1[W
MV
2 ] − ∆E1[W
SM





r²γ − 8 = 0
We give sample plots for R∗ (see ﬁgure 2).
epsilon=0.1 epsilon=0.5 epsilon=0.9
gamma









Figure 1: R∗ for N = 3, ² ∈ {0.1,0.5,0.9}, γ ∈ [0,1]
The upper line indicates the case ² = 0.1, the middle line represents ² = 0.5, and the
lower line is ² = 0.9. Note that we can make the same observations as in section 4.4
concerning R(N,²,γ): R∗ is decreasing in γ and ².
Graphics for N = 5 and N = 7 are given in Appendix C.
226 Conclusion
We have introduced a new 2-period voting scheme that strengthens the impact of ﬁrst-
period voting losers. This scheme improves the ex ante utility of the whole society if
individuals are suﬃciently risk-averse.
Numerous issues deserve further research. For instance, it is useful to consider more
periods or to examine the case where the beneﬁts {zi1}N
i=1 are private information.
This assumption is crucial for the equilibrium voting behavior. This voting behavior
is desirable from a technical point of view as it maximizes the number of individual
with voting right in the second period. On the other hand, voting results also have a
signaling eﬀect. A strong majority, i.e. a unambiguous voting result with e.g 80% of the
votes might be necessary, especially when the decision is upon political or economical
power. It helps keeping a political system stable and makes unpopular decisions or
reforms possible. It might be helpful to construct voting schemes that do not impose
minimal winning majorities6. In addition, one can randomly select individuals from
the majority to ensure that a suﬃciently large number of individuals will keep their
voting right.
The investigation of these and other issues will help to identify useful applications of
the minority voting scheme.
6This could be achieved by applying MV only if the size of the minority in the ﬁrst period is within
a certain interval.
237 Appendix
7.1 Appendix A: Calculations
7.1.1 An Approximation for the LHS of Inequality (2)
Step 1: Approximation with Normal Distribution
The function P(w) describes the value of a binomially distributed random variable X:
P(w) = P(X ≥ w−1
2 ), i.e. the probability that at least w−1
2 other individuals vote in
the same way as the individual under consideration. Binomially distributed random
variables can be approximated by the normal distribution in the following way.
Suppose X is a binomially distributed random variable with parameters n and p. If
n becomes suﬃciently large and p remains ﬁxed, then X is approximately normally
distributed with mean value µn = np and variance σ2
n = np(1 − p), e.g.




where X ∼ B(n,p), Y ∼ N(µn,σ2
n), and P[X ≤ c] denotes the probability that a
random variable X adopts a value less or equal to c. The additional term +1
2 is called
continuity correction.
Now we want to apply this result to P(N). Note that P(N) = P[X ≥ N−1
2 ] with
X ∼ B(N − 1, 1
2). We obtain



















































































The next step is to show that the approximation of the LHS of equation (2) in section
4.3 tends to
√
2 − 1 as N goes to inﬁnity.
Step 2: The Limit of the Approximation
Q(N) =
(N − 1)(P(N−1
2 ) − P(N))





















































































• lim(an bn) = lim(an)lim(bn) and lim(an
bn) =
lim(an)





















2 ) − P(N))















































































































































In the case where N ≡ 1(4), e.g. bN−3
4 c = N−5
4 , one needs to adjust the intelligent 1 we






= 1 to obtain
the same result.
7.1.2 The Ex Ante Case with |I−| ≤ N−1
2
Since utility in the ﬁrst period is the same under both voting schemes, we only examine
the expected utility in the second period. To obtain ∆E1[W MV
2 ] and ∆E1[W SM
2 ], we
will sum up the expected utility of the second period if the second project is undertaken
for all possible realizations of ﬁrst-period preferences {zi1}N
























2 )F(−γ,1) + (1 − 2P(N−1
2 ))F(−γ,0) + (P(N−1
2 ) − 1)F(−γ,−1)]
+β2[P(N−1
2 )F(−1,1) + (1 − 2P(N−1
2 ))F(−1,0) + (P(N−1
2 ) − 1)F(−1,−1)]
+α[P(N−1
2 )F(γ,1) + (1 − 2P(N−1
2 ))F(γ,0) + (P(N−1
2 ) − 1)F(γ,−1)]
+(N−1
2 − β1 − β2 − α)[P(N−1
2 )F(1,1) + (1 − 2P(N−1
2 ))F(1,0)
+(P(N−1


























2 )F(−γ,1) + (1 − 2P(N−1
2 ))F(−γ,0) + (P(N−1
2 ) − 1)F(−γ,−1)]
+β2[P(N−1
2 )F(−1,1) + (1 − 2P(N−1
2 ))F(−1,0) + (P(N−1
2 ) − 1)F(−1,−1)]
+(N−1
2 − β1 − β2)[P(N−1
2 )F(γ,1) + (1 − 2P(N−1
2 ))F(γ,0)
+(P(N−1
2 ) − 1)F(γ,−1)]
+(α − N−1
2 + β1 + β2)1
2[F(γ,1) − F(γ,−1)]
+(N − α − β1 − β2) 1
2[F(1,1) − F(1,−1)]
io
where α denotes the number of individuals i with zi1 = γ and β1 (β2) denotes the
number of individuals i with zi1 = −γ (zi1 = −1).



























β1[P(N)F(−γ,1) + (1 − 2P(N))F(−γ,0) + (P(N) − 1)F(−γ,−1)]
+β2[P(N)F(−1,1) + (1 − 2P(N))F(−1,0) + (P(N) − 1)F(−1,−1)]
+α[P(N)F(γ,1) + (1 − 2P(N))F(γ,0) + (P(N) − 1)F(γ,−1)]
+(N − β1 − β2 − α)[P(N)F(1,1) + (1 − 2P(N))F(1,0) + (P(N) − 1)F(1,−1)]
i
277.1.3 The Ex Ante Case with |I−| ≥ N+1
2
If the majority has negative beneﬁts in connection with the ﬁrst project, the status
quo prevails, i.e. a1 = 0. In this case F(zi1,zi2) reduces to F(zi2). If we set zi1 = 0 for
all individuals i, we obtain the same result as in the case a1 = 0. Therefore we identify











































P(N)F(0,1) + (1 − 2P(N))F(0,0) + (P(N) − 1)F(0,−1)
i
The factor 1
2 represents the probability that at least N+1
2 individuals have negative
ﬁrst-period beneﬁts.
7.2 Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
The ﬁrst point is obvious, as abstention eliminates the voting right without any beneﬁt.
Suppose the number of project losers k ≥ N+1
2 and there are more than N+1
2 project
losers who vote for a1 = 0 in the equilibrium, i.e. Nw − Nl > 1. If individual i
belongs to the majority: i ∈ Nw, then assuming that all other individuals will play
their equilibrium strategies deviating from his strategy by voting for the new project
increases individual i’s payoﬀ: the status quo still prevails and therefore ui1 = 0 but
i keeps his voting right in t = 2. Given |Nw − Nl| = 1, no individual in the majority
has an incentive to deviate, as such a switch will change the committee decision, and
the individual under consideration still loses his voting right.
The same arguments hold mutatis mutandis for the third point of Proposition 1.
28Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose in t = 2 there are w individuals who are allowed to vote. If w is odd, some
individual i wins if at least w−1
2 persons vote in the same way as individual i. If w is
even, this occurs either if w
2 individuals vote in the same way or there is a tie-break in
favor of the preferences of the agent under consideration in the case of a tally, i.e. if
w



























2w−1, if w even
The second term of P(w) in case w is even stems from the tie-breaking rule. By using
the following equalities we can simplify the former expression:



























= 2w−2 if w even








Proof of Proposition 2
We ﬁrst rewrite ∆E2[W MV












0 f(²zi1 + zi2)dzi2 + (1 − P(N−1
2 ))
R 0















2 )(F(zi1,1) − F(zi1,0)) + (1 − P(N−1













2 )F(zi1,1) − (2P(N−1
2 ) − 1)F(zi1,0) + (P(N−1


























2 ) − P(N)] − F(zi1,0)[2P(N−1
2 ) − 2P(N)]
+F(zi1,−1)[P(N−1













Rearranging terms proves Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 3
In the case a1 = 0, the utility of the second period is independent of zi1, i.e. A(zi1) =
















As we have assumed strictly increasing utility functions, we have A > 0. Thus inequal-












] ≥ 0 (4)
In the following we will show that this inequality holds.




















We show this inequality via complete induction. Note that Pcond(N) is oscillating.
That means Pcond(N) is decreasing with respect to N with N ≡ 3(4) and decreasing
30with respect to N with N ≡ 1(4), but if we observe two odd numbers in a row then
the function may either decrease or increase. We therefore make a double induction.





































2. Suppose inequality (5) holds for N ≥ 3. If Pcond(N +4) ≤ Pcond(N) then inequality
(5) also holds for N + 4. We show this step for N ≡ 3(4) and N ≡ 1(4). This proves
the proposition.
























































































































− (N + 4)











16N − (N + 4)












16N(N + 4)(N + 2)









(N + 4)(N + 2)
(N + 3)(N + 1)
´
< 0
31The LHS is smaller than zero for all odd numbers N. We show that the RHS is greater













































− (N + 3)
(N+1
2 )(N−1
2 ) · (N−3
2 )!
bN+1
4 c · bN−3
4 c! · (2 + N−3
2 − (bN−3












− (N + 3)
(N+1
2 )(N−1
2 ) · (N−3
2 )!
bN+1
4 c · bN−3
4 c! · (N−1
2 − bN−3





















For the last step we need to distinguish between N ≡ 1(4) and N ≡ 3(4).
In the ﬁrst case we have bN+1
4 c = N−1
4 , bN−3




4 c = N+7
4 .
If N ≡ 3(4), i.e. N+1
4 / ∈ N, we obtain bN+1
4 c = N+1
4 , bN−3
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32if N ≥ 5. Since we have shown that Pcond(N) < 0 for N = 3,5,7 this inequality
completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5







exp(−r) + exp(r) − 2
i


































where exp(−r²zi1) ≥ exp(−r²zj1) ∀j ≥ i. Therefore we can conclude that if there exist
i,j ∈ {1,...,N} with zi1 6= zj1 then AW < AL, i.e.
AW
AL is strictly smaller than 1.
We want to show that there exists a r ≥ 0 such that for all combinations of ﬁrst-period
beneﬁts {zi1}i∈{1,...,N} MV is better than SM. Therefore the next question is under what
conditions
AW


























2 (zi1 − zj1)exp(−r²(zi1 + zj1))
Recall that zi1 ≤ zj1 as i ∈ {1,..., N−1
2 } while j ∈ {N+1
2 ,...,N}, i.e. i < j, and that
zi1,zj1 ∈ {−1,−γ,γ,1} with γ ∈ (0,1). Therefore the term (zi1 − zj1) can take the
33following values: −2, −1−γ,−1+γ,−2γ and 0, i.e. zi1−zj1 ≤ 0 ∀ i, j. Furthermore,
we can conclude that at least one factor is strictly smaller than zero as long as there
exists at least one pair of individuals (i,j) with diﬀerent beneﬁts if the ﬁrst-period
project is realized (zi1 6= zj1), i.e.
AW
AL is strictly decreasing in this case.
Let α1 and α2 denote the number of voting winners j with zj1 = 1 and zj1 = γ
respectively. Let β1 (β2,β3,β4) denote the number of voting losers i with zi1 = 1











β1e−r² + β2e−r²γ + β3er²γ + β4er²
i
Since exp(x) goes to inﬁnity as x goes to inﬁnity and exp(−x) goes to zero as x goes






Under the assumptions of this proposition
AW
AL is strictly monotonically decreasing.
For every tuple {zi1}N
i=1, there exists r∗ such that MV is better than SM if utility is
described by exp(−r²zi1+zi2) with r ≥ r∗. Since there are only ﬁnite possibilities how







2] = Q(N) for all r ≥ R and all possible tuples
{zi1}N
i=1.
Proof of Corollary 2




2−1. Therefore we ﬁrst determine the combination










β1e−r² + β2e−r²γ + β3er²γ + β4er²
i.
34First, β4 has to be zero because the denominator has to be as small as possible. By
the same argument β3 = 1, since there has to be at least one individual who suﬀers
from the project. The numerator is maximal if α2 = N+1
2 and α1 = 0. Due to the
equilibrium reﬁnement β1 has to be zero since otherwise individuals with the highest
beneﬁt would have voted against the proposal. It follows that β2 = N−1
2 −1. We obtain
max(
AW











⇔ N − 1 ≤ (
√















Since we are looking for the smallest ˆ R such that MV is better than SM if risk aversion












Proof of Proposition 6
We use the already introduced notation A(zi1) = F(zi1,1) − 2F(zi1,0) + F(zi1,−1).
The diﬀerence between the aggregated expected utilities is given by
35∆E1[W
MV































) − P(N))[β1A(−γ) + β2A(−1) + αA(γ) + (
N − 1
2


































) − P(N))[β1A(−γ) + β2A(−1) + (
N − 1
2























2 − P(N) < 0, P(N−1
2 ) − P(N) > 0 and N−1
2 P(N−1
2 ) − NP(N) + N+1
4 < 0
(see proof of Proposition 3). Rearranging terms yields
∆E1[W MV

























·[β1A(−γ) + β2A(−1) + αA(γ) + (N−1


















·[β1A(−γ) + β2A(−1) + (N−1

















































2 ) − N+1
4 ]1
2A(0)
All coeﬃcients are positive (on both sides of this inequality). We also know that A(zi1)
is positive for all zi1 ∈ {−1,−γ,γ,1}. To show that there is an R such that this
36inequality holds for all r ≥ R, we ﬁrst multiply the inequality by e−r and then evaluate
the convergence properties of each term, i.e. each A(zi1) separately. Note that on the
RHS there are only terms with A(0), A(γ) and A(1).
e−rA(−1) = 1
r(er(²−2) − 2er(²−1) + er²) → ∞ (r → ∞)
e−rA(−γ) = 1
r(er(²γ−2) − 2er(²γ−1) + er²γ) → ∞ (r → ∞)
e−rA(0) = 1
r(e−2r − 2e−r + 1) → 0 (r → ∞)
e−rA(γ) = 1
r(er(−²γ−2) − 2er(−²γ−1) + e−r²γ) → 0 (r → ∞)
e−rA(1) = 1
r(er(−²−2) − 2er(−²−1) + e−r²) → 0 (r → ∞)
The RHS multiplied by e−r tends to zero as r goes to inﬁnity, while the LHS multiplied
by e−r tends to inﬁnity. That means that there exists a smallest R ∈ R such that the
LHS is greater than the RHS.
Proof of Lemma 4
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2 ) − P(N))(N−1
2 − β1 − β2) + (1
2 − P(N))(α − N−1

















































































2 ) − NP(N) + N+1
4 ]
We immediately obtain C,c3 and c4 as positive since P(N−1
2 ) − P(N) > 0. Secondly,
c5 < 0 because N−1
2 P(N−1
2 ) − NP(N) + N+1
4 < 0. We now analyze the ﬁrst summand
37that determines c1. Note that the second summand is negative as 1
2 − P(N) < 0. The
ﬁrst sum amounts to
N−1
2 P(N−1
2 ) − NP(N) + N+1
4 − (α + β1 + β2)P(N−1
2 ) < 0.
Therefore c1 is also proved to be negative. The relations between the coeﬃcients are
obvious: c3 = c4 since the expected welfare gain of project losers when they form
a minority is the same (one can switch the role of β1 and β2 without changing the
results). Individuals with zi1 = γ expect a higher utility gain through strategic voting
than individuals with zi1 = 1 because of our MM assumption, but they also realize
utility losses by belonging to the voting winners. We obtain c1 < c2 < c3.
Proof of Lemma 5
The factor 1
















−c2γe−r²γ + c4γer²γ > 0
⇔ c4e2r²γ > c2
which is fulﬁlled since ex > 1 ∀x > 0 and c4 > c2. Using Lemma 4 and ²,γ > 0 yields
∂H(r)
∂r > 0. Therefore ∆E1[W MV
2 ]−∆E1[W SM
2 ] is monotonically increasing in r as soon
as H(r) ≥ 0.
387.3 Appendix C: Tables and Graphics
Sample Values of ˆ R(N,²,γ)
• The ﬁrst tables contain ˆ R(N,²,γ) for N with N ≡ 3(4). 7
Table 1a: ² = 1/2.
γ/N 3 7 11 15 19 23 51 103 1003
1
4 2.77 6.16 8.35 9.56 10.48 11.23 14.37 17.17 26.26
1
2 1.39 3.08 4.18 4.78 5.24 5.61 7.19 8.58 13.13
3
4 0.92 2.05 2.78 3.19 3.49 3.74 4.79 5.72 8.75
Table 1b: γ = 1/4.
²/N 3 7 11 15 19 23 51 103 1003
1
10 13.86 30.81 41.77 47.77 52.39 56.14 71.87 85.84 131.29
1
2 2.77 6.16 8.35 9.56 10.48 11.23 14.37 17.17 26.26
3
4 1.85 4.11 5.57 6.37 6.99 7.49 9.58 11.45 17.51
1 1.39 3.08 4.18 4.78 5.24 5.61 7.19 8.58 13.13
• The ﬁnal tables contain the value of the parameter r such that
max
AW
AL = Q(N) for small N with N ≡ 1(4).
Table 3a: ² = 1
2.
γ / N 5 9 13 17 21 25 29
1
4 8.79 9.52 10.32 11.05 11.73 12.26 12.85
1
2 4.39 4.76 5.16 5.53 5.87 6.13 6.42
3
4 2.93 3.17 3.44 3.68 3.91 4.09 4.28
Table 3b: γ = 1
4.
² / N 5 9 13 17 21 25 29
1
10 43.94 47.58 51.58 55.27 58.65 61.3 64.25
1
2 8.79 9.52 10.32 11.05 11.73 12.26 12.85
3
4 5.86 6.34 6.88 7.37 7.82 8.17 8.57
1 4.39 4.76 5.16 5.53 5.87 6.13 6.42
In the following we will provide sample plots that show R∗, the threshold out of the ex
ante comparison for N = 5 and N = 7.
7For N = 3 and N = 7 we calculated the ’real’ ˆ R using the direct comparison between AW
AL and
Q(N). The approximation Q(N) ≈
√
2 − 1 is useful for N ≥ 11.
39N = 5





r²γ − 3584 = 0
8Again we give a sample plot for R∗ with ² ∈ {0.1,0.5,0.9}.
epsilon=0.1 epsilon=0.5 epsilon=0.9
gamma







Figure 2: N = 5, ² = 0.1, γ ∈ [0,1]
Again, the upper line indicates the case where ² = 0.1, the middle line represents
² = 0.5, and the lower line uses ² = 0.9.
8If N = 5 then ∆E1[WMV
2 ]−∆E1[WSM
2 ] = 1









r²γ − 90112 = 0
9Again we give samples for R∗.
epsilon=0.1 epsilon=0.5 epsilon=0.9
gamma









Figure 3: N = 7, ² = 0.1, γ ∈ [0,1]
9If N = 7 then ∆E1[WMV
2 ] − ∆E1[WSM
2 ] = 1
47 r
1
32(e−r + er − 2)[−92208e−r² − 57040e−r²γ +
29568er² + 29568er²γ − 90112].
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